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1. Introduction
Public capital maintenance expenditures are important for infrastructure services, which in turn
are a key instrument for long-run growth. In particular, outlays on public capital maintenance cover
activities required for infrastructure to function and are necessary for its repair and safe operation,
compared to spending for the purchase, construction, rehabilitation, and improvement of physical
infrastructure that comprises newinvestment. The two types of capital spending are expected to
operate via di¤erent channels on the capital accumulation process: newpublic investment embeds
the standard concept of resources that add to the existing capital stock, whereas public capital
maintenance operates by a¤ecting the depreciation rate, and consequently the service life, of public
capital goods.1
Several country reports and case studies from developing countries demostrate that the lack of
su¢ cient public capital maintenance has been a critical factor for the observed growth stagnation,
since in most cases infrastructure building is given a higher priority than maintenance. According
to the World Bank (1994), lack of maintenance in key infrastructure sectors (like roads, railways,
power, and water) in developing countries caused losses equivalent to a quarter of their annual
investment in infrastructure in the early 1990s, whereas a similar situation was faced in most South
Eastern European countries during the last decade (World Bank, 2000). A large fraction of public
capital maintenance involves spending on roads, for which maintenance expenditures typically
1A major obstacle in assessing the role of capital maintenance is that there is no systematic recording of mainte-
nance expenditures, because they are treated as a current expenditure and are not assigned a separate category in
the national accounts or any other macroeconomic data source. However, some evidence suggests that public capital
maintenance comprises a non-negligible share of output. In the United States a report by the Congressional Budget
O¢ ce (2007) provides detailed time series data for public infrastructure on transportation and water covering the
period 1956-2004. According to the evidence, the average size of these expenditures has been around 2.6% of GDP
with the share of O&M expenditures amounting to 49% of total. Also, data on capital spending in newly purchased
assets and maintenance from the Canadian survey on Capital and Repair Expendituresshow that total public capi-
tal maintenance and repair expenditures in Canada amounted on average to 1.5% of GDP for the period 1956-93 and
comprised 21% of total public capital spending; see McGrattan and Schmitz (1999) and Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis
(2005) for a more detailed presentation of this dataset. Yepes (2004) estimates that infrastructure maintenance in
East Asian countries amounted to 2.2% of GDP over the period 1996-2005 and covered roughly 30% of total capital
expenditures.
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account between 30 to 60% of total expenditures and as much as 0.5% of GNP (Gwilliam and
Shalizi, 1999). Harral and Faiz (1988) estimated that the maintenance level required to prevent
road deterioration amounted to 0.2% of GDP for East Asia and Pacic countries and to 1% for
West African countries for 19861990; in turn, the backlog of maintenance work varied from 1.6%
of GDP in East Asia and the Pacic to 3.5% in South Asia.2 The inuence that public capital
maintenance may have on the growth process should therefore make scal policies related to capital
expenditures and their allocation an important factor in models that attempt to understand the
behavior of the macroeconomy.
Despite the intuitive consensus on the crucial impact of maintenance expenditures in public cap-
ital formation, there have been only recently some systematic attempts to investigate their growth
impact.3 Rioja (2003) has set up a growth model where domestic tax revenues nance maintenance
expenditures for public capital, whereas public infrastructure is nanced solely by foreign donors.
The author shows that the optimal maintenance level (as a share of GDP) depends upon various
parameters and presents calibration results from Latin American countries that conrm the im-
portance of maintenance for the pattern of growth in these countries. Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis
(2004) have extended Riojas (2003) model by concentrating on the growth implications of public
capital maintenance expenditures. In their model, both types of expenditures are nanced by a
tax on output as in Barro (1990); by altering their allocation the government can use the share of
maintenance as a policy instrument to raise the shadow value of private capital and the growth rate
of the economy. An appealing implication is that the growth-maximizing tax rate is higher than
2These estimates concur with anecdotal evidence from various studies. The World Development Report (World
Bank, 1994) stated that an additional $12 billion spent on timely road maintenance in Africa could have saved $45
billion spent in reconstruction. Also, the allocation of recurrent expenditures in the 1993/4 budget for Ethiopia was
estimated to be less than half of what would be needed for regular road maintenance (International Monetary Fund,
1995); see also Table 1 in Gwilliam and Shalizi (1999) for additional anecdotal evidence. The study by Heggie and
Vickers (1998) corroborates these assessments by stating that the return for road maintenance projects between 1961
and 1988 was 38.6 percent compared to 26 percent for all transport projects and 21 percent for all World Bank
investment projects.
3The assessment of the impact of public capital maintenance is usually performed in the context of cost-benet
analysis and examines primarily the issue of road damage and optimal user charges, which rely on required repairs
and their timing (see Newbery, 1988).
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the elasticity of public capital in the production function (which reverses a standard argument put
forward by, among others, Barro (1990), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Devarajan et al. (1998)),
as the additional positive e¤ect of maintenance expenditure on the accumulation of public capital
raises the benets of taxation compared to the standard models.4
A natural extension of this framework envisages the role of public capital as a rival and non-
excludable good that is subject to congestion; as argued by Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), virtu-
ally all services provided by the public sector, like transport and energy, are subject to congestion.5
In turn, models of productive government services, such as those developed by Barro and Sala-I-
Martin (1992), Turnovsky (1997a, 1997b), and Fisher and Turnovsky (1998), have assumed that
the input of public capital to private production is subject to congestion and have established that
the degree of congestion is important in assessing the linkages between growth, public and private
capital, and represents a key determinant of tax policies.
The task of integrating public capital maintenance in a growth model with congestion in pub-
lic capital appears therefore to be a stimulating challenge.6 The purpose of the present paper is
to provide a unied framework for analyzing the macroeconomic implications of these issues by
formulating a growth model with endogenous public capital depreciation and congestion in public
capital services, in order to explore the steady-state properties of the economy and the associ-
ated rst-best and growth-maximizing scal policies. To this end, we follow the mainstream class
of infrastructure-led endogenous growth models developed by Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-I-
4In an empirical context, Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2005) provide evidence that the Canadian economy would
benet in terms of growth from a reallocation between newpublic investment and maintenance expenditures.
5Although the concept of congestion appears theoretically sound and rising congestion levels in public services are
typically observed in most countries and regions, it does not translate easily into operational guidelines regarding
its growth e¤ects. Data on congestion are not systematically collected on a cross-country basis and the existing
evidence is based on local or national studies involving mainly the transportation sector. For instance, Schrank and
Lomax (2005) report that the cost of congestion in the US transportation sector, which accounts for more than 30%
of total infrastructure, has increased from 12.5 billion Dollars in 1982 to 63.1 in 2003 (in constant 2003 prices). Some
cross-country estimates indicate that the ensuing costs of congestion are found to exceed 3.5 per cent of GDP (United
Nations, 2002).
6Interestingly, several reports from developed and developing countries often associate the rising costs of congestion
with insu¢ cient infrastructure maintenance; see United Nations (2006).
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Martin (1992), which have stressed the role of government productive activities as key determinants
of long-run growth, by assuming that private sector productivity is a¤ected by government produc-
tive services in a balanced budget framework. In our approach the production side of the economy
follows Turnovsky (1997a, 1997b) and Fisher and Turnovsky (1998) by adopting the view that the
public capital stock rather than the ow of government expenditures is crucial for economic activity.
In this setup, where the public capital stock is subject to congestion, the government can decide
on the public capital accumulation rate by investing either in newpublic capital, or by retarding
the rate of decay of installed capital through public maintenance expenditures.
Our major ndings can be summarized as follows. We nd that a threshold level of expendi-
tures for public capital maintenance, which depends qualitatively on the level of congestion in the
economy, is necessary for the existence of the balanced growth path. The key mechanism is that a
rise in newpublic investment and, consequently, output also raises the public capital depreciation
rate and reduces public capital accumulation due to increased public capital usage. The magnitude
of the rise in public capital usage depends upon congestion and hence economies with low (high)
congestion in public infrastructure, in which the rise in output is high (low), will require a threshold
level of public capital maintenance (newpublic investment) for ongoing growth.
We also establish that, in the presence of congestion, the share of maintenance expenditures in
total public capital expenditures is a critical determinant of the optimal and the growth-maximizing
government size. Consequently, if the level of congestion in the economy changes the government
can use the two scal policy instruments, namely the tax rate and the composition of public capital
expenditures, for the design of scal policies to improve welfare and growth. In particular, the
optimal tax rate is positively related to the degree of congestion because of the negative externality
leading to an over-accumulation of private capital. The optimal tax rate will be even higher in the
presence of public capital maintenance, because the implied rise in public capital maintenance along
with aggregate public capital expenditures reduces the depreciation rate of public capital and, as
a result, the additional tax revenues can nance newpublic investment at a greater proportion.
Hence, the government also benets from the re-allocation between newpublic investment and
maintenance to improve welfare.
These results have some important policy implications. First, the requirement of a minimum
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level for public capital maintenance (and also for newpublic investment) in order for the econ-
omy to attain sustainable growth conforms with the common view that stagnant growth is often
associated with the lack of a critical level of public capital maintenance required to boost growth.
Second, our results underline the importance of the e¢ cient policy mix between public capital
maintenance and newpublic investment for the design of scal policies. In particular, our nd-
ings imply that when congestion rises (falls), the government can benet by steering public capital
expenditures away from (towards) maintenance and towards (away from) newpublic investment
without necessarily altering the size of public expenditures. In the same vein, a government that
faces crowded roads and empty ports can steer the mix of the existing public capital expenditures
towards building new roads and maintaining the existing ports, in order to improve public sector
e¢ ciency.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 solves the decentralized equilibrium
problem and section 3 studies the steady state and the dynamic properties of the model. Section 4
presents the social planner problem and derives the rst-best scal policies. Section 5 investigates
the growth-maximizing scal policies and, nally, section 6 discusses the results and concludes the
paper.
2. The model
This section presents a representative agent model with congestion in public capital, in which
maintenance expenditures by the government a¤ect the depreciation of the public capital stock.
The main features of the model are as follows: (a) the production function of the rm depends upon
the private and public capital stocks, with the latter providing a positive production externality to
private rms, (b) the production function exhibits a congestion e¤ect in the acquisition of public
capital services by the private sector, (c) public maintenance expenditures a¤ect negatively the
decay of public capital, and (d) public capital services in the form of expenditures on newpublic
investment and public capital maintenance are nanced by a tax on output. Lower- and upper-case
variables denote individual and aggregate quantities, respectively.
2.1. The representative agent
Consider an economy populated by N homogenous agents with no population growth. The
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representative consumer-producer in this economy consumes, c, of the production good, in order
to maximize the following intertemporal logarithmic utility function:
max
1Z
0
log(c)e tdt (1)
The representative agent produces a single traded good, y, by facing the following Cobb-Douglas
production function:
y = f(k;Ksg) = y = (k)
a

Ksg
N1 
1 a
; 0 < a < 1 (2)
where k denotes the individual private capital stock and Ksg denotes the public capital services. We
assume that public capital services are subject to congestion and parameter  2 (0; 1) measures the
degree of congestion. To eliminate any scale e¤ects we assume that the productivity of individual
private capital depends on the average level of public capital services, which is in turn determined
by the number of individuals that uses them and the degree of congestion. For instance, under no
congestion ( = 0) all individuals make e¢ cient use of the public services and the productivity of
private capital depends on the average public capital services given by
Ksg
N .
We assume that the services derived by the agent from the public capital stock are given by:
Ksg = Kg

k
K

(3)
where K denotes the aggregate private capital stock. Specication (3) follows a concept put for-
ward by Edwards (1990) and formalized by, among others, Turnovsky (1997a, 1997b), Fisher and
Turnovsky (1998), and Gomez (2004), and implies that public capital is congested by the use of pri-
vate capital. This specication embodies relativecongestion where the level of services derived by
the agent from the provision of a public good is in terms of the usage of the individual capital stock
relative to the aggregate private capital stock (as, for instance, in the transport sector).7 Within
7Relative congestion is opposed to absolutecongestion where the public capital stock is congested by the aggregate
private capital stock (like, for instance, in the case of police protection); see Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) for an
extensive discussion on these two concepts of congestion. We opted for the specication with relative congestion for
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this context,  = 0 corresponds to the no-congestion case, whereas  = 1 implies full congestion
and the private capital has to rise in direct proportion to the aggregate private capital stock to
maintain a xed level of public services available to the rm.
The representative agent is endowed with an initial capital stock k(0) > 0 and accumulates
private capital by spending on investment, i. The private capital accumulation constraint is then
given by the following law of motion:
:
k = i  kk (4)
where k denotes the constant private capital depreciation rate.8
2.2. Government Sector
The government invests in newpublic capital, Ig, and maintains the public capital stock, Mg,
to a¤ect its decay rate. We assume that the law of motion for public capital accumulation is given
by:
:
Kg = Ig   g(Mg
Y
)Kg (5)
where the depreciation function g() is continuous and has the following properties: 0g() < 0,

00
g () > 0, lim
Mg
Y
!0
g() = 1 and lim
Mg
Y
!1
g() = g where g 2 (0; 1). This setup covers the general
denition of capital maintenance as the . . . deliberate utilization of all resources that preserve
the operative state of capital goods (Bitros, 1976), where as far as public capital is concerned
it encompasses the . . . wide range of activities aiming at keeping infrastructure at a serviceable
condition (Heller, 1991). We assume that the depreciation rate cannot be diminished below a
threshold, g, determined by the physicaldepreciation due to capital ageing and other technical
two reasons. First, relative congestion is associated with sectors of economic activity that are closer to infrastructural
capital. Second, absolutecongestion in the production function yields a scale e¤ect that is empirically implausible.
Notice that the results derived later on are not qualitatively a¤ected if the specication with absolutecongestion is
adopted.
8Assuming that private capital depreciation is endogenously determined would not a¤ect qualitatively the results
derived later on, provided that private maintenance enters as a ratio of the private capital stock, rather than output,
in the depreciation function. This would be a plausible assumption since it implies that private capital depreciation
is a¤ected by the usage of the private capital stock, in contrast to public capital depreciation that depends upon its
aggregate usage given here by output; see the next subsection.
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factors. We also assume that the public capital depreciation rate is a negative function of public
maintenance expenditures as a ratio of aggregate economic activity, Y . Hence, public capital
depreciation is a positive function of the usage of public capital by all agents of the economy
(including the public sector) given by total economic activity. This assumption implies, for instance,
that public roads will deteriorate faster if the aggregate production activity by both the private and
public sectors in the economy is high. In turn, the government can choose the level of maintenance
expenditures as a share of output to determine the depreciation rate of its capital stock.
The government nances expenditures by levying a at tax rate on private output,  2 (0; 1).
Assuming a balanced budget the government budget constraint is given by:
Y = Ig +Mg (6)
To ease exposition, we parameterize public maintenanceMg as a share on tax revenues by g 2 (0; 1)
and thus the corresponding share for newpublic investment is given by (1   g). The internal
allocation of government expenditures can then be written as:
Ig = (1  g)Y (7)
Mg = gY (8)
2.3. The representative agent problem
The representative agent in the economy receives income from after-tax production (income)
that is allocated to investment and consumption:
(1  )y = i+ c (9)
The aggregate production of the economy is allocated to consumption, private and public invest-
ment, and public capital maintenance. The economy-wide resource constraint is given by:
Y = C + Ik + Ig +Mg (10)
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By summarizing the above constraints and using (4) in (9) we get that the ow budget constraint
is given by:
:
k = (1  )y   c  kk (11)
given the initial capital endowment k(0) > 0:
The intertemporal problem of the representative agent is to maximize lifetime utility (1) subject
to (11). The current-value Hamiltonian of the problem is given by:
H = log(c) + ((1  )y   c  kk)
The rst-order conditions are given by:
1
c
=  (12)
(1  )
"
(a+ (1  a))k (1 a)(1 )

1
K
(1 a)
(Kg)
1 aN (1 a)(1 )
#
= + k  
:


(13)
lim
t!1(t)k(t)e
 t = 0 (14)
Equation (12) is the standard condition stating that at the optimum the marginal utility of
consumption equals the shadow price of wealth, . Equation (13) states that at the optimum the
after-tax marginal product of capital is equal to the opportunity cost of investing in capital, which
in turn equals the depreciation of physical capital, and the rate of time preference minus the capital
gain. The after-tax marginal product of private capital is augmented by the level of congestion
because investment in private capital also raises the marginal benets that the individual derives
from the public capital stock given the aggregate private capital stock. Congestion operates then as
an externality of the public capital stock on private decisions; see also Turnovsky (1997a, 1997b).
3. Balanced growth and equilibrium dynamics in the decentralized economy
The Balanced Growth Path (BGP) is dened a state where the variables of the economy grow at
a constant rate. Since all agents in the economy are identical, the equilibrium relationship K = Nk
links the aggregate and individual capital stocks.
Denition 1. The competitive equilibrium of the economy is dened for the exogenous policy
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instruments  ; g, and aggregate allocations Ik; Ig;Mg; C;K;Kg such that the individuals solve their
intertemporal utility maximization problem by choosing c and i given  and g.
Taking the time derivative of (12) and substituting in (13), we get after aggregating that the
equilibrium growth rate of aggregate consumption, C, is given by:

C
C
= (1  )(1  (1  a)(1  ))

Kg
K
(1 a)
    k (15)
Also, after aggregating the feasibility constraint of our economy, (11), we get that the aggregate
private capital stock evolves as:

K
K
= (1  )

Kg
K
(1 a)
  C
K
  k (16)
Using (7) and (8) in (5) the equilibrium growth rate of public capital is given by:

Kg
Kg
= (1  g)

Kg
K
 a
  g
 
g

(17)
and the transversality condition under (12) is now modied to:
lim
t!1
k(t)
c(t)
e t =1 (18)
At the BGP the growth rates of consumption, public and private capital have to grow necessarily
at the same rate, i.e.

C
C =

K
K =

Kg
Kg
= g. This result is easily obtained by investigating the
equilibrium growth rates of these variables separately. In particular, for the consumption growth
rate, given by (15), to be constant in the steady-state we see that both K and Kg have to grow
at the same constant rate, say gk = gkg = g. Since the steady-state ratio of public to private
capital will be constant, the equilibrium growth rate of consumption, gc, will be constant too.
Then, by inspection of (16), in order for the growth rate of private capital to be constant we need
that gk = gkg and gc = gk (for
K
Kg
and CK to be constant respectively). Taken together with the
previous condition on the consumption growth rate to be constant these conditions imply that
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gc = gk = gkg = g. Since this condition also satises (17), as well as the transversality condition,
(18), the necessary condition for the existence of a BGP in this economy is that all variables grow
at the same rate, g.
Given the above necessary condition for a BGP we can now derive the equilibrium growth rate
of the economy. We rst dene the following auxiliary stationary variables, namely !  CK )

!
! 
C
C  

K
K , z  KgK )

z
z 

Kg
Kg
 

K
K . By solving (15) for z we obtain that at the BGP:
z =

g + + k
(1  )(1  (1  a)(1  ))
 1
(1 a)
(19)
Substituting then (19) in (17) we obtain the equilibrium growth rate of the economy implicitly as:
(g)  g   (1  g)

g + + k
(1  )(1  (1  a)(1  ))
  a
1 a
+ g
 
g

= 0 (20)
where the solution of this continuous function for g > 0, such that (g) = 0, determines the
existence and the properties of the equilibrium growth rate.
Proposition 1. A unique positive equilibrium growth rate, g, exists in our economy and
is given by (20) i¤
g(g)
(1 g) (1   )
 a
1 a <

1 (1 a)(1 )
+k
 a
1 a
holds for given parameter values and
exogenous policy instruments.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Notice that our economy will exhibit a zero equilibrium growth rate if the necessary and su¢ cient
parametric condition holds with equality. A crucial remark is that the two scal instruments, 
and g, are critical not only for the quantitative determination of the equilibrium growth rate, but
also for the existence of a non-negative BGP. In fact, a direct consequence of Proposition 1 is that
there exists a subset in the domain of the policy instruments that forms a set of su¢ cient values
for sustainable growth. The following Corollary formalizes this point.
Corollary to Proposition 1. Given the parametric characteristics of the economy, there
exists a range (g; ^g) 2 (0; 1) of public maintenance expenditures as a share of public capital
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expenditures that has to be implemented in order for Proposition 1 to hold. The boundaries of the
public maintenance expenditure share are given by the following conditions.
(I) Lower bound of maintenance share: The share of maintenance expenditures in total pub-
lic capital expenditures has to exceed a minimum value, g > 0, where
g(g)
(1 g) (1   )
 a
1 a =
1 (1 a)(1 )
+k
 a
1 a
, in order for the economy to attain the BGP for any value of  2 (0; 1) . This
share exists i¤ 1 > 

(1 )(1 (1 a)(1 ))
+k
 a
1 a
. A su¢ cient parametric condition for a non-zero
lower bound for maintenance expenditures to exist is given by  < +k a1 a .
(II) Upper bound of maintenance expenditures: There exists an upper bound for the share of
maintenance expenditures in public capital expenditures, g < ^g < 1, where
g(^g)
(1 ^g) (1  )
 a
1 a =
1 (1 a)(1 )
+k
 a
1 a
for any value of  2 (0; 1), in order for the economy to attain the BGP.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 in conjunction with cases (I) and (II) of the Corollary show that there exists a
range g < g < ^g that is necessary for the existence of a positive long-run growth rate in the
economy for any value of  2 (0; 1). In particular, economies that are described by (I) will face
non-positive steady-state growth regardless of their government size, unless adequate resources on
public capital maintenance are spent. For su¢ ciently high levels of public investment an additional
unit of newpublic capital boosts aggregate economic activity and hence the usage of the existing
public capital stock, which depends upon the degree of congestion, rises. This generates the need for
additional public capital maintenance because the depreciation rate of public capital is endogenously
determined by the share of maintenance expenditures in output, g . Due to the convexity of the
depreciation function, at su¢ ciently low levels of maintenance activity the positive e¤ect of public
investment on public capital accumulation is outweighed by the negative e¤ect generated through
the rise on the usage of public capital through its depreciation rate. As a result, a minimum
level of maintenance is necessary to sustain a positive growth rate of public capital in the long
run. The inverse happens for su¢ ciently high levels of maintenance activities: the benets on the
depreciation rate are diminishing and, moreover, are bounded by the natural depreciation rate.
A threshold level of newpublic investment is therefore necessary as well for attaining long-run
growth.
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These e¤ects depend on the level of congestion in the economy through the degree of public
capital usage determined by economic activity, Y . As indicated by Part I of Corollary to Proposition
1, when congestion is su¢ ciently low the usage of the public capital stock will be high. This raises
the depreciation of the existing capital stock and in order for the growth rate of public capital to
follow a balanced growth path a minimum level of maintenance is required to preserve the existing
capital stock at the higher usage.9
Hence, when the minimum level of public capital maintenance is not reached, new public
investment will not be adequate to attain long-run growth due to the high depreciation of public
capital. This result extends the point by Rioja (2003) and Kalyvitis and Kalaitzidakis (2004)
on the importance of these expenditures for growth maximization by showing that public capital
maintenance expenditures are necessary for the existence of sustainable growth. On the ipside,
the condition on the upper bound for maintenance expenditures states that a country has to set
public capital maintenance expenditures at a level that will ensure a minimum level of investment
in newpublic capital.10
Finally, given the initial value of public to private capital ratio, z0, we can examine the local
stability of the economy that is determined by the two-dimensional system:

!
!
=  (1  )(1  )(1  a)z1 a + !    (21)

z
z
= (1  g)z a   g
 
g
  (1  )z1 a + ! + k (22)
9Notice that the other structural characteristics of the economy are important for the BGP as well. In particular,
the elasticity of public capital in the production function, the depreciation rate of private capital, the rate of time
preference, and congestion a¤ect ceteris paribus the threshold level of public maintenance expenditures to attain
positive growth. For instance, a high rate of time preference (low propensity to save) and a high depreciation rate
of private capital a¤ect negatively the growth rates of consumption growth and private capital. In these cases the
private agents cannot benet adequately from public capital services and the high usage of the public capital stock
requires a threshold level of maintenance expenditures as a share of output in order for capital accumulation to
generate positive growth.
10Notice that, as in Barro (1990), a similar reasoning applies for the lower and upper bound of the government size
required to ensure positive growth. It is straightforward to show that Proposition 1 imposes boundaries for the tax
rate since it does not hold for  = 0 or  = 1.
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where a dot above a variable denotes the corresponding derivatives with respect to time. In matrix
notation we can write:264 !
z
375 =
264 !  ((1  )(1  )(1  a)2(z) a!
z

(1  g)( a)(z) 1 a   (1  )(1  a)(z) a

z
375
264 !   !
z   z
375
The determinant of the above system is given by:
J = !z
 (1  g)a(z) 1 a   (1  (1  )(1  a))(1  )(1  a)(z) a
with J < 0, since (1  g)a(z) 1 a + (1  (1  )(1  a))(1  )(1  a)(z) a > 0 for any positive
value of z (which can be easily shown to exist). Thus the system comprised by (21) and (22) is
locally saddle-path stable.
4. Optimal policies
In this section we solve the social planner problem in order to determine the optimal scal
policy. To this end, we will derive the optimality conditions for the social planner economy and
we will then determine the optimal government size (tax rate) with the shares of its components,
newpublic investment and public capital maintenance, chosen optimally in order to replicate the
rst-best environment.
4.1. The Social Planner problem
The objective of the social planner is to maximize social welfare given by:
max
1Z
0
log(C)e tdt
subject to the economys aggregate resource constraint:
Y = KaK1 ag = C + Ik + Ig +Mg (23)
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and the law of motion for the aggregate public and private capital stocks:
_K = I   kK (24)
_Kg = Ig   g(Mg
Y
)Kg (25)
given the initial public and private capital stocks, K(0) and Kg(0). Equation (23) denotes the
aggregate resource constraint in our economy. In contrast to the decentralized equilibrium, the
production technology in the social planner problem internalizes the congestion externality, since
the social planner solves for the aggregate quantities.
The current value Hamiltonian for the above problem is given by:
H = log(C) + (KaK1 ag   C   kK   Ig  Mg) + (Ig   g(
Mg
Y
)Kg)
where the choice variables are C, Ig, Mg, and the state variables of the economy are K, Kg. The
rst-order conditions are given by:
1
C
=  (26)
 =  (27)
 0g(
Mg
Y 
)
Kg
Y 
=  (28)
a

Kg
K
1 a
  k + a0g(
Mg
Y 
)
Mg
Y 
Kg
K
=  
:
+  (29)
(1  a)

Kg
K
 a
+ (1  a)0g(
Mg
Y 
)
Mg
Y 
  g(
Mg
Y 
) =  
:
+  (30)
Equations (26) to (30) yield the optimal allocations in the social planner economy given the initial
conditions and the associated transversality conditions. Specically, equation (26) shows that at
the optimum the marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal change of wealth. Equation
(27) implies that the benet of increasing public investment measured by the shadow price of public
capital equals the cost in wealth by allocating expenditures of consumption and maintenance on
investment. As opposed to the decentralized equilibrium, the social planner decides for the optimal
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allocation of public investment and maintenance expenditures with the latter given by (28). The
government faces then a trade-o¤ in allocating resources to maintenance and investment as both
expenditures a¤ect positively the accumulation rate of public capital and are related through the
government resource constraint.
Substituting (26), (28), and (27) in (29) we can obtain the consumption growth rate in the
socially planned economy, gspc :
gspc 
_C
C
= a

Kg
K
1 a
[1  M

g
Y 
]    k (31)
Also, by the feasibility constraint and the private and public capital accumulation rates, and by
(7) and (8), we obtain that:
gspk 
_K
K
= (1  )

Kg
K
1 a
  C

K
  k (32)
gspg 
_Kg
Kg
= (1  g)

Kg
K
 a
  g(
Mg
Y 
) (33)
where gspk and g
sp
g denote the equilibrium growth rates of public and private capital in the social
planner economy. In the presence of congestion the share of public expenditures for capital main-
tenance a¤ects the growth rates of consumption and public capital in the social planner economy.
This occurs because of the required taxation imposed on private agents, since the return to private
investment exceeds the social one. To internalize the distortion, the individual producer who accu-
mulates k (and thus contributes positively to aggregate usage given by Y ) has to provide additional
resources to maintain the public services available to other agents, where the required compensation
should equal Mg=Y times the addition to Y . In turn, by substituting (27) in (28) we can obtain
the optimal allocation of maintenance expenditures to output by the following condition:
 0g(
Mg
Y 
) =
Y 
Kg
 (z) a (34)
Equation (34) determines the optimal public to private capital ratio and states that it is optimal
for the government to equate the change in the depreciation rate of public capital generated by
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public capital maintenance relative to its usage with the average product of public capital. Further-
more, (29) and (30) represent the optimal conditions with respect to the private and public capital
stocks respectively. Using (27) and (28) in (29) and (30), and by virtue of (8), we can obtain that:
a(1  g)(z)1 a   k = (1  a)(1  g)(z) a   g
 
g

(35)
Equation (35) yields the ratio of public to private capital in the social planner economy as a function
of the parameters of the economy and the policy instruments and shows that the net returns of
private and public capital are equalized at equilibrium. The marginal products of private and public
capital are now reduced as the output share of public capital maintenance increases. The marginal
benet of spending one unit in public capital maintenance, Mg , is given by the fall in g
 
g

and the rise in the net return on Kg . At the same time, there are less available resources (output
units) for C + Ik + Ig and as Mg rises the marginal products of the capital stocks are reduced by a
fraction (C+Ik+IgY ), since the last unit of output spent on maintenance has to have the same impact
on welfare with the corresponding one spent on the other components of output.
Notice that if the exogenous depreciation rate of private capital happens to coincide with the
endogenous depreciation rate of public capital evaluated at the optimum, then the ratio of public
to private capital is given by the familiar condition z = 1 aa , which states that it depends upon the
ratio of the corresponding capital stock elasticities in the production function. This condition how-
ever is only a special case here, as the public to private capital ratio will depend on other variables
and parameters of the economy as well, such as the maintenance to output ratio, the endogenous
depreciation rate of public capital and the private depreciation rate. It is straightforward to show
that a well-dened z > 0 exists for any parameter value of our economy in the assumed domain
and that it is a function of the structural characteristics of our economy.11
11Equation (35) can be written as (z) = a(1  g)(z)1 a   k   (1  a)(1  g)z a + g
 
g

= 0 and has
the following properties:
(1) (z) is continuous function for z > 0 since it is the addition of continuous functions.
(2) @(z
)
@z = a(1  a)(1  g)(z) a(1 + (z) 1) > 0
(3) lim
z!1
(z) = +1
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4.2. Optimal scal policies
Given the solution of the social planner and the decentralized equilibrium, the government
aims at choosing that tax rate and the composition of public capital expenditures that enable the
competitive equilibrium to achieve a rst-best allocation of resources. Using (8) the consumption
growth rate in the social planner economy can be written as:
gspc = a
 
1  g

(z)1 a     k (36)
Since, by (36),(32), and (33), at the BGP consumption, public capital, and private capital have
to grow at the same rate, in order to enable the decentralized equilibrium to replicate the rst-
best outcome the government has to set the tax rate at the level that equates the growth rate of
consumption of the decentralized economy with the one attained by the social planner.12 From
(15) and (36) we obtain the optimal tax rate with public capital maintenance under congestion:
 =
(1  a)
(1  a) + a(1  g)
(37)
The optimal tax rate is clearly feasible for any value of congestion and maintenance in their
domain. Under public capital maintenance and congestion, the optimal tax rate di¤ers from that
derived by Barro (1990) and is a more general case of the policy rule derived by Kalaitzidakis and
Kalyvitis (2004). To highlight equation (37), we rst consider some limit cases. If there is no
congestion in the economy ( = 0), the optimal tax rate is equal to zero since there is no distortion
on individual decisions; this is a manifestation of the well-know Chamley (1986) result that capital
should be untaxed at the optimum. On the opposite, under full congestion the optimal tax rate
is given by =1 =
1 a
1 ag , which states that the optimal tax rate depends positively on the public
(4) lim
z!0
(z) =  1
From 1-4 it follows that there exists z > 0 that solves (z) such that (z) = 0 and it is unique.
12Notice that the growth rates of public and private capital are quantitatively di¤erent than the ones obtained
in the decentralized economy because the corresponding consumption growth rates are di¤erent. By equating the
consumption growth rate of the social planner with the competitive equilibrium through the optimal tax rate, the
decentralized economy will achieve the outcome of the social planner in terms of the growth rates of public and
private capital as well.
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maintenance expenditures to output ratio.13 As has been pointed out in Kalyvitis and Kalaitzidakis
(2004), the endogeneity of public capital depreciation renders the Barro (1990) optimal taxation
rule suboptimal, as maintenance expenditures increase the marginal cost of public funds and the
government size has to exceed the elasticity of public capital in the production function to equal
the corresponding marginal benet. In the case of partial congestion (0 <  < 1), the tax rate is
lower and we can establish that it is a positive function of the level of congestion, , for a given
share of public capital maintenance:
@
@
=
a(1  a)(1  g) 
1  (1  )(1  a)  ga
2 > 0 (38)
Equations (37) and (38) extend the optimal taxation rule derived by Gomez (2004), which also
states that the government has to implement a positive time-invariant tax rate in order to drive the
decentralized economy to the rst best outcome. The optimal tax rate is positively related to the
degree of congestion in the economy as a result of the implied intensity of the negative externality:
the higher return to private investment and the over-accumulation of private capital triggered by
congestion have to be diminished by imposing a higher tax on output in order to attain the social
optimum. Moreover, the optimal tax rate is higher in the presence of public capital maintenance
because agents do not take into account the positive e¤ect on aggregate activity generated by
their over-investment in private capital. Hence, the optimal tax rate will be positively related to
maintenance expenditures, which have to be raised to sustain the high usage of public capital.
However, the e¤ect of congestion on the optimal tax rate is now mitigated as the government
can benet from a re-allocation between newpublic investment and public capital maintenance to
achieve the rst-best outcome. In particular, we can investigate the long-run impact of congestion
by using equations (34), (35) and (37), which determine jointly the three endogenous variables of
the model, ; z; g, in terms of the exogenous parameters.14 The total e¤ects of congestion on
13Note that in the case of full congestion the optimal taxation rule coincides with the growth-maximizing rule
derived later on, because the economy has to grow at the maximum rate, in order for the decentralized economy to
eliminate the externality and replicate the rst-best environment.
14Since this is a perfect foresight model, our comparative static exercises are equivalent to an unanticipated change
in congestion.
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the optimal tax rate and the optimal allocation of government revenues to maintenance are given
by:
d
d
jtotal = A

Bg + 
> 0 (39)
dg
d
=   A

g
Bg + 
< 0 (40)
where A  @@ > 0 is the partial derivative of the optimal tax rate w.r.t.  given by (38) and
B  @@g =
a(1 a)
(1 (1 )(1 a) ga)
2 > 0 is the partial derivative of the optimal tax rate w.r.t. g
determined by (37). Taking the total derivative of the optimal tax rate given in (37), we obtain
equation (39) alternatively as:
d
d
jtotal = A+B
dg
d
(41)
Here, A represents the positive direct e¤ect of congestion on the optimal tax rate (taxatione¤ect)
and (B
dg
d ) represents the negative indirect e¤ect triggered by congestion through the change in
the optimal share of maintenance expenditures (reallocatione¤ect). The taxatione¤ect clearly
dominates the reallocatione¤ect, since the total e¤ect of congestion on the optimal tax rate is
positive, as shown by (39). These results are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. The taxatione¤ect of congestion on the optimal tax rate is positive. The
reallocatione¤ect of congestion on the optimal share of public capital maintenance in total public
capital expenditures is negative. The total e¤ect of congestion on the optimal tax rate is positive.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Proposition 2 generalizes the impact of congestion on optimal scal policy. The policy change
in the optimal allocation of resources brought about by congestion, which is captured by the term
(B
dg
d ), mitigates the required increase in the optimal tax rate, because the government can now
benet from the optimal re-allocation of public capital expenditures between newinvestment and
public capital maintenance. Intuitively, a rise in congestion reduces the amount of public services
extracted by the private agent and increases their marginal value, thus increasing the optimal tax
rate (taxatione¤ect). At the same time, the rise in aggregate public capital expenditures reduces
the depreciation rate of public capital. With a constant di¤erential between the marginal products
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of private and public capital, equation (35) implies that the share of public capital maintenance in
output has to fall to equalize the net returns of the capital stocks. As a result, the additional tax
revenues nance newpublic investment at a greater proportion (reallocatione¤ect).
We can also investigate the impact of congestion on the allocation of public capital expenditures
when the government aims at holding the tax rate constant. In such a case, the government can
use the internal allocation of resources as an alternative policy instrument, whereas the tax rate
remains una¤ected by congestion. This e¤ect is given by:
dg
d
jd=0 =  
1  g

< 0 (42)
Equation (42) gives the optimal response of government expenditures in maintenance as a share
of total public capital expenditures following a marginal change in the level of congestion for a
xed government size. In particular, following a rise (fall) in congestion the government should
reduce (increase) the level of public capital maintenance. Therefore, following a rise in congestion
the government can improve e¢ ciency by altering the composition of public capital expenditures
between maintenance and newinvestment instead of imposing a higher tax on production to raise
public services, as Proposition 2 would imply. A direct consequence of (42) is that countries or
regions facing scal limitations can re-allocate the existing public resources by steering expenditures
towards (away from) newpublic investment and away (towards) public capital maintenance in
response to higher (lower) congestion. Therefore, in the presence of increasing congestion in public
capital (and assuming that maintenance expenditures and newinvestment exceed their threshold
values dictated by the Corollary to Proposition 1), the government is equipped with an extra policy
instrument for the conduct of optimal scal policy.
5. Growth-maximizing policies
In this section we analyze growth-maximizing scal policy rules. Modern growth theory has
shown particular interest in growth-enhancing policies, as the understanding of the forces of eco-
nomic growth is crucial in order to identify the relative merits and synergies of government inter-
ventions in areas like the formation and allocation of public capital. Moreover, the growth rate
is usually the main measurable objective of the government and hence it is useful to assess the
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contribution of the components of public capital expenditures aiming at long-run growth.
To analyze the scal policies that aim at growth-maximization in the context of the present
model, we extend the approach adopted by Kalyvitis and Kalaitzidakis (2004) by taking into
account the impact of congestion on the e¤ects on the growth-maximizing government size and the
share of maintenance expenditures as follows.
Denition 2. Growth-maximizing policies in the competitive equilibrium of the economy are
given under Denition 1 when the government chooses ~ and ~g in order to maximize the long-run
growth rate of the economy by taking into account the aggregate maximizing behavior of individuals,
and the government budget constraints and the feasibility and technological conditions are met.
The problem of long-run growth-maximizing policies can then be formulated as:
max ~g( ; g; z) = (1  )(1  (1  a)(1  ))~z1 a     k
subject to the decentralized equilibrium response by the private agent given by the system (21)
and (22). Taking the rst-order conditions, we can obtain after some algebra the following growth-
maximizing conditions:
~ =
1  a
1  a~g
(43)
 0g
 
~g~

= ~z a (44)
(1  ~g)~z a~   g
 
~g~
  (1  ~)(1  (1  )(1  a))~z1 a + k +  = 0 (45)
Equations (43), (44), and (45) express the three endogenous variables, ~ , ~g, ~z, in terms of the
model parameters and determine the rules that the government has to satisfy to attain growth-
maximization. Equation (43) coincides with the growth-maximizing tax rate obtained by Kalaitzi-
dakis and Kalyvitis (2004) and states that public maintenance expenditures a¤ect positively the
growth-maximizing size. The size of these expenditures as a share of total public capital expendi-
tures is then determined by the curvature of the public capital depreciation function, determined in
(44) in terms of the average product of public capital determined. As in Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvi-
tis (2004), the Barro (1990) growth-maximizing tax rate is suboptimal and depends upon public
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maintenance expenditures. However, the growth-maximizing tax rate does not depend here solely
on the growth-maximizing share of expenditures in public capital maintenance. Taking the total
derivatives in the above system we can assess the response of the policy variables with respect to
congestion, which are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. The e¤ects of congestion on the growth-maximizing tax rate and the growth-
maximizing share of public capital maintenance in total public capital expenditures are ambiguous
and depend upon the magnitude of the elasticity of the public capital depreciation rate with respect
to the share of public capital maintenance expenditures in total public expenditures.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Congestion impacts on the growth-maximizing government size through the change in the
growth-maximizing allocation of government expenditures on maintenance. However, the outcome
di¤ers from the rst-best solution where the planner takes the public to private capital ratio, z,
as given by (34). The tax rate depends now on the response of the public capital depreciation
rate (a¤ected by the equilibrium level of maintenance to output ratio) and the associated average
product of public capital. For instance, a rise in congestion increases initially the average product
of public capital as private agents over-accumulate private capital. This lowers the public to private
capital ratio and raises output directly through the production function. As output rises the usage
of public capital rises too, which in turn raises the public capital depreciation rate and reduces the
public capital stock. If the elasticity of the depreciation function is su¢ ciently low the positive
change in the marginal benet of public funds through congestion is outweighed by the fall in the
marginal benet of public funds and maintenance expenditures, and the government size has to fall.
On the ip side, a fall in congestion will raise the marginal benet of maintenance expenditures and
the average product of public capital if the response of the depreciation rate w.r.t. public capital
maintenance (measured by the corresponding elasticity) is large enough. This will generate the
need for additional expenditures on public capital maintenance, which in turn requires a higher tax
rate to nance these outlays.15
15By substituting (43) and (45) in (44), it is straightforward to show that the total e¤ect of congestion on growth-
maximizing scal policies under congestion depends on the initial level of congestion and the structural parameters of
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6. Discussion and conclusions
The aim of the paper was to explore the steady state and scal policy implications of public
capital maintenance in an endogenous growth model under the presence of congestion in public
capital services. We showed that a minimum amount of capital expenditures has to be devoted in
public capital maintenance and newpublic investment in order for the economy to attain steady-
state growth. This result extends the set of mechanisms that underline the importance of threshold
levels for scal variables in order to attain long-run growth. These thresholds stem now from the
composition of public productive expenditures in two separate categories with di¤erential impacts
on public capital accumulation and growth, and as in the case of the tax rate in the Barro (1990)
model, the threshold levels arise in the form of sine qua non conditions (rather than as a priori
assumptions) for long-run growth.
In practice, however, the threshold level for maintenance expenditures can be a more di¢ cult
policy target to achieve: public capital maintenance often has a low priority in government budgets,
as this form of outlays are politically less appealing and visible than new investment projects,
and hardly a¤ect the condition of the public capital stock for some time. This has often led to
maintenance deferral, as the consequence of deferring many types of public capital are not visible
in the short or medium-run to myopic voters and further hardens the provision of adequate resources
for public capital maintenance.16
We also found that in the presence of congestion, maintenance expenditures are important for
the rst-best taxation rule. The share of maintenance expenditures a¤ects positively the optimal
government size due to the change on the marginal cost of public funds. The government can
also benet from the re-allocation between newpublic investment and maintenance to improve
e¢ ciency at the existing tax rate in the presence of increasing (decreasing) congestion by shifting
capital expenditures away from (towards) public capital maintenance. Thus, following the spirit of
Devarajan et al. (1996) our ndings extend the set of mechanisms that highlight the importance
of the composition of public productive expenditures for growth.17 Given that most countries
the economy. For instance, if the initial congestion level and the intensity of public capital in the production function
are low, the e¤ect of congestion on the growth-maximizing share of maintenance is more likely to be positive.
16Hulten and Peterson (1984) discuss in more detail the issue of maintenance deferralin the public sector.
17The existing growth literature on the optimal composition of public spending typically distinguishes between
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have a dual budget structure comprised by the recurrent budget (presenting spending on salaries
and operations-maintenance) and the investment budget (involving one-o¤ capital expenditures
on projects), it is always important for policymakers to achieve e¢ cient resource allocation.18
E¢ cient composition of public capital expenditures becomes more important in the presence of
binding nancial constraints, such as those posed by the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank to less developed economies or faced by local authorities under scal distress, which
limit the provision of expenditures for public services.19 According to the optimal scal policy rules
presented here, public maintenance expenditures are necessary to ensure adequate replacement of
obsolete capital and reduce the need for future investment to rehabilitate deteriorated assets, and
should therefore be treated as an integral part of productive outlays, particularly when scal targets
distinguish between current and capital expenditures.
We close the paper by noting that another important determinant of the depreciation rate
that merits further investigation involves the utilization rate of public capital. Although casual
empiricism suggests that the decay of public services varies along with their utilization rate, the
latter is typically introduced only in the context of the endogenous determination of private capital
depreciation.20 A promising route for further research might therefore deal with the analysis of a
growth model involving public capital maintenance and utilization, along with their implications
for scal policies.
productive expenditures, which a¤ect private sector productivity, and unproductive (or consumption) expenditures,
which a¤ect intertemporal utility, and identies their impacts on growth and welfare. See, for instance, Lee (1992)
and Turnovsky and Fisher (1995).
18The problem may be more acute in developing countries where the total budget often includes various donor-paid
expenditures on recurrent items that generate a mixture of recurrent and capital budget items; see also World Bank
(1998). An additional reason for policymakers to favour newinvestment projects when forming the budget is that
maintenance activities may be more di¢ cult to monitor in practice.
19Bumgarner et al. (1991) provide empirical evidence that support the hypothesis that deciencies in public capital
maintenance are to a large extent caused by scal distress. See Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) and Estache (2004)
for a more general discussion on the importance of public capital maintenance expenditures in the presence of scal
rules.
20See the early contributions by Nickell (1978, chapter 7), Schworm (1979) and the more recent ones by, among
others, Boucekkine and Ruiz-Tamarit (2003) at the rm level, in Licandro et al. (2001) and Aznar-Marquez and
Ruiz-Tamarit (2004) in growth models.
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Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary.
Proof of Proposition 1. We can establish the following properties of (g) for g > 0 :
1. (0) = g
 
g
  (1  g)  (1 )(1 (1 a)(1 ))+k  a1 a
2. @(g)@g = 1 + (1  g) a1 a

(1 )(1 (1 a)(1 ))
g++k
 1
1 a 1
(1 )(1 (1 a)(1 )) > 0
3. @
2(g)
@g2
=  (1  g) a(1 a)2  1[(1 )(1 (1 a)(1 ))]2

(1 )(1 (1 a)(1 ))
g++k
1+ 1
1 a
< 0
4. lim
g!1(g) = +1
5. lim
g!1
@(g)
@g = 1
6. (g) is continuous in g.
Under the necessary and su¢ cient condition established in Proposition 1 and from the properties
of the continuous function (g) it follows that g exists and it is unique. Under the continuous and
strictly increasing (g), and under its limit properties for an increasing and positive g, it follows
straightforward that, if (g) starts from a non-positive value as implied by condition
g(g)
(1 g) (1  
)
 a
1 a <

1 (1 a)(1 )
+k
 a
1 a
, then it crosses the horizontal locus of the (g;(g)) space. Then, (g)
has a xed point g > 0 such that (g) = 0.
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 1.
Proof of (I). We will show that g = 0 implies a non-positive growth rate for the econ-
omy according to Proposition 1. Assuming g = 0, Proposition 1 implies that 1 < (1  
)
a
1 a
h
1 (1 a)(1 )
+k
i a
1 a
. Since (1   ) a1 a < 1, a su¢ cient parametric condition for 1 < (1  
)
a
1 a
h
(1 (1 a)(1 ))
+k
i a
1 a
not to hold is
h
1 (1 a)(1 )
+k
i a
1 a
< 1. It follows that  < +k a1 a is a
su¢ cient parametric condition under which Proposition 1 does not hold for any  2 (0; 1) and
g = 0 generates non-positive growth. Thus, the government has to implement a level g > g  0,
where
g(g)
(1 g) (1 )
a
1 a =

1 (1 a)(1 )
+k
 a
1 a
implies g = 0. This level g exists and is unique, since
g
 
g

is a convex function with respect to g and (1   g)

(1 )(1 (1 a)(1 ))
+k
 a
1 a
is linear
and strictly decreasing in g. It follows that Proposition 1 holds for values of g  g.
Proof of (II). This follows directly from Proposition 1. If g = 1 then from Proposition 1 we
get that g () < 0, which is a contradiction for any  2 (0; 1) by the properties of the depreciation
rate function for public capital. Since g
 
g

is a convex function with respect to g while
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(1 g)

+k
(1 )(1 (1 a)(1 ))
  a
1 a
is linear and strictly decreasing, there exists g < ^g < 1, where
g(^g)
(1 ^g) (1  )
a
1 a =

+k
1 (1 a)(1 )
  a
1 a
, for which Proposition 1 holds.
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 2.
Equations (34), (35) and (37) give the solution for the optimal values of the maintenance to
output ratio, the tax rate and the public to private capital ratio. Taking the total derivatives of
the above system for g; ; z w.r.t.  we can study the e¤ect of congestion on optimal tax rate
and the optimal maintenance share of government revenues. After some algebra the corresponding
matrix for the above system of equations is given by:
266664

11 
12 
13

21 
22 
23
0 1  B
377775
266664
dz
d
dg
377775 =
266664
0
0
A
377775

d

where 
11 = a(z
) 1 a, 
12 =  00(g)g, 
13 =  00(g), 
21 = a(1   g)(1   a)(z) a +
a(1   a)(1   g)(z) 1 a, 
22 =  ag((z) 1 a + (z) a), 
23 =  a((z)1 a + (z) a), and
B > 0, A < 0 are given in the text. The determinant of the matrix is given by:
D
 = 

a(z) a   00(g)(1  a)(1  g)

where  = ((z) a + (z) a 1)(Bag + a) > 0. The sign of the determinant is ambiguous and
depends on the curvature of the depreciation function, on the technology parameters of public and
private capital in the production function, and on the optimal levels of the tax rate and the ratio of
public capital maintenance to total public capital expenditures. We shall henceforth assume that
a(z) a   00(g)(1  a)(1  g
 6= 0 holds in order for the system to have a solution. Applying
Cramers rule on the above system of equations we can show that:
d
d
=
Aa((z)a + (z) 1 a)

> 0
dg
d
=  Aa

g((z
)a + (z) 1 a)

< 0
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which correspond to equations (39) and (40) in the text. The last part of Proposition 2 follows
then directly from (41).
Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 3.
Equations (43), (44), and (45) characterize the solution of the system for the three unknowns,
namely ~g, ~ , ~z. The system of total derivatives is given in matrix notation as follows:266664
v11 v12 v13
v21 v22 0
0 1  W
377775
266664
d~z
d~
d~g
377775 =
266664
0
(1  ~)(1  a)~z1 a
0
377775

d

+
266664
0
 1
0
377775

d

where v11 = a~z 1 a, v12 =  00(~g~)~g, v13 =  00(~g~)~ , v21 =  a~(1   ~g)~z 1 a   (1   a)(1  
~)(1  (1  )(1  a))~z a, v22 = ~z a + (1  (1  )(1  a))~z1 a, and W is a positive constant. The
determinant of the matrix is given by:
Dv =  

~z 1 a + ~z a(1  (1  )(1  a)) h~z a   00(~g~)(1  ~g)~  W + ~giWa
and has an ambiguous sign. From (44) and dening the elasticity of the derivative of the depreciation
function with respect to maintenance to output ratio as "~g~ 
 00(~g~)
0g(~g~)
~g~ > 0, we can set the
following conditions:
.1: The depreciation function is linear, 00(~g~) = 0, or the elasticity of the depreciation
function with respect to the maintenance to output ratio is su¢ ciently low, such that "~g~ <
~g
(1 ~g)( W +~g)
, then Dv < 0.
.2: The convexity of the depreciation function measured by the elasticity of the depreciation
function is high, such that "~g~ >
~g
(1 ~g)( W +~g)
, then Dv > 0.
Thus, when the depreciation function curvature is su¢ ciently low (or, equivalently, the growth-
maximizing maintenance to output ratio is su¢ ciently high) we have Dv < 0 for any parameter
value. Applying Cramers rule on the above system we can characterize the e¤ect of congestion on
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the growth-maximizing policy variables, ~ and ~g. The e¤ect of congestion on ~ is given by:
d~
d
=  a~z
 1 a(1  ~)(1  a)~z1 aW
Dv
The e¤ect of congestion on the growth-maximizing government size depends the sign of the
determinant and it is positive for .1 and negative for .2. Increasing congestion increases the
growth-maximizing government size. This is an indirect e¤ect that comes from the e¤ect of con-
gestion on the growth-maximizing allocation on maintenance expenditures where, by (43), main-
tenance a¤ects the growth-maximizing government size. The e¤ect of congestion on the allocation
of government revenues to maintenance is then given by:
d~g
d
=  a~z
 1 a(1  ~)(1  a)~z1 a
Dv
This multiplier shows that under .1 congestion a¤ects positively the growth-maximizing allo-
cation of maintenance expenditures in government revenues, whereas the e¤ect is negative under
.2; again, the sign depends on the response of the depreciation function. By a closer inspection
of (44) the degree that congestion a¤ects the internal allocation of expenditures depends on the
public to private capital ratio and, in turn, on its e¤ect on the average product of public capital.
This e¤ect is given by:
d~z
d
=
 00(~g~)(1  ~)(1  a)~z1 a(~gW + ~)
Dv
which is positive under .1 and negative under .2. Taking into account the e¤ect of  on ~z and
using the conditions for d~d and
d~g
d , we get that:
d~
d
jtotal =W
d~g
d
? 0
d~g
d
jtotal = a~z
 1 a
00(~g~)(~gW + ~)
d~z
d
? 0
from which Proposition 3 follows directly.
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